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[ ] spoke to me concerning reports which he had received from PSB and others to the effect that State Department was not fulfilling its obligation to produce political intelligence needed by the operational units. He made it entirely plain that these were merely unsubstantiated rumors which he was calling to my attention for verification, rather than for any direct action at this time. [ ] further commented on the value of the report formerly put out monthly and now put out quarterly by the Moscow Embassy. [ ] that it would be most helpful to have these reports reinstated on a monthly basis. We also discussed the possible value of a State publication at some periodic interval containing a roundup of political intelligence, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union. Apparently State does not produce this type of material at present, and the DIPSUM does not fulfill this need. I may mention this need informally to Park Armstrong. In the meantime, we should survey the adequacy of political intelligence coverage by State from the point of view of CIA Offices and units. If this indicates that there is a serious gap in intelligence production in this field, proposals should be instituted to insure that State fulfills its responsibility and, if it is unable to do so, that some other allocation of primary responsibility is worked out. 9 May, 8

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Lunched with [ ] of PSB, at which time we discussed difficulties of obtaining adequate research and intelligence support for psychological and political warfare activities. 15 May, 7

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Asked [ ] whether he would have any objection to my showing the [ ] study on social science research to Park Armstrong, since I was taking some action to obtain better coordination in the intelligence field in this area. He had no objections. 4 June, 13

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Raised with Mr. Wisner my plan to consult Park Armstrong in order to raise the question of coordination of psychological and political intelligence. I outlined my view that this coordination might be accomplished through State leadership with CIA participation, but stated that I did not want to proceed with it until assured that it would be satisfactory to our Operational Offices, the intelligence support operations of which would be impinged upon. Mr. Wisner agreed to my proceeding as planned, subject to the understanding that it would be within the discretion of the Operational Offices to determine the line between intelligence research and operational information, a point with which I concur. 11 June, 10

5

Upon reading a memorandum from Mr. Reber indicating certain technical objections to a State request for assistance in connection with the organization of psychological warfare activities, I called Fisher Howe (in the absence of Park Armstrong) and indicated that we were sympathetic to a further development of State's resources in this connection and would seriously consider any request for assistance. I suggested, however, that Armstrong, Howe and myself have a discussion before any such letter was dispatched. Fisher indicated that they would know, within 15 or 20 days, whether State's request for additional funds for this purpose from Congress would be granted,

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in which event they would, at most, have to ask for interim aid from CIA. That was the primary reason they did not dispatch the letter in question. I suggested, nevertheless, that Armstrong, Howe and myself have a talk as soon as Mr. Armstrong returns to his office. 16 June, 8

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Talked with Mr. [ ] Deputy Director of R&DB, which has in mind a project for coordinating all research in Defense relating to Psychological Warfare. They have in mind requesting Max Millikan to serve on a part-time basis as the chairman of their panel. This choice seemed excellent to me. I outlined briefly to [ ] the fact that we were engaged in promoting coordination in this field, but felt that it would be most helpful to have an intra-Defense coordination established. It was my personal feeling that R&DB would be an excellent focal point for this activity. [ ] also informed me that [ ] had requested R&DB to coordinate all Defense research relating to para-military activities. Here, again, I thought that intra-Defense coordination would be most helpful, but it, of course, would have to be coordinated with us. Millikan's acceptability to all sides would seem to make him an excellent choice. Later informed DD/P of all this. 1 July, 8

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[ ] (Ext. 54741) of R&DB informed me that Dr. Millikan, although willing to serve as a panel member, should not act as chairman. This relates to R&DB's proposed panel to coordinate psychological warfare intelligence support within the Department of Defense. I indicated that I would seek other individuals to suggest and suggested, further, that R&DB consider some of the PSB staff members for this job. 17 July, 2

8

Had an extended talk with Fisher Howe, during which I recommended that State initiate action to survey and coordinate intelligence support for psychological operations, both overt and covert. Fisher indicated that they had given serious consideration to this question and were not prepared to take immediate action, in part on the theory that the present requirements are being met to the best of their ability and, in part, on the feeling that a large portion of the area to be coordinated lay within the control of operational organizations rather than in the intelligence community. I indicated to Mr. Howe that, in any event, Frank Wisner and I would have our needs surveyed and recommendations made as to how they could be satisfied. This might result in a substantial increase in Mr. Wisner's organic intelligence units, which would have to afford the type of detailed support which psychological operations require and which State was not presently set up to afford. Mr. Howe recognized a difference between this type of support and the psychological warfare research in which State was engaged in support of the Departmental programs and the National Intelligence effort. I indicated to Mr. Howe that we would consult with his office while making this survey and he designated Phil Trenise (Deputy to Allen Evans) as his representative on this subject. 18 August, 17

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- 9 In a discussion with Mr. Reber, indicated that I would like to see a draft paper recommending an inter-Agency study on intelligence support for psychological warfare. Gen. Balmer had now put this problem into the POCG (Psychological Warfare coordinating committee) which was composed of representatives of the operators. I plan to attend the next meeting of that group in order to discuss this proposal. Later mentioned this to Mr. Dulles. 28 August, 15

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- 10 [redacted] Deputy Director of R&DB, asked whether we had any reaction to a [redacted] as prospective chairman of their PW research panel. I was unable to find anyone in CIA who was able to give any reaction to [redacted] and so informed [redacted]. 15 September, 1

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- 11 Based on to [redacted] of R&DB the information I had received respecting [redacted] and assured him that CIA would welcome [redacted] as a chairman of the proposed PW research panel. It might be most helpful to have a free-wheeler in that position. 16 September, 9

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